able to a decision maker (Levin, Johnson, Russo, & versatile model to explain various framing effects. They pointed out the many confusions raised by comparing Deldin, 1985; Shoorman, Mayer, Douglas, & Hetrick, choice phenomena that may involve different framing 1994), the justification required for a choice (Miller & mechanisms. For this reason, framing effects should Fagley, 1991) , the decision maker's perspective change have a clearer definition. According to them, there are from his/her own money to his/her clients' money (Roszat least three types of framing effects, each associated kowski & Snelbecker, 1990) , the relationship between with its own kind of framing: (1) risky choice framing hypothetical decision recipients and a decision maker affecting a decision maker's willingness to take a risk; (Wang & Johnston, 1995) , and the size of a social group (2) attribute framing affecting the encoding and evalufor which a decision problem is described (Bohm & ation of object or event characteristics; and (3) action Lind, 1992; Wang & Johnston, 1995) .
framing affecting the persuasiveness of a communicaThese findings call attention to the dynamic features tion. They argued a need for different perceptual or of framing effects and the production rules that control cognitive processes to explain the distinct types of their presence and absence. In some contexts, framing framing effect. effects appear robust and sizable. In others, the effects In this study the author examines the dynamics of appear highly variable and erratic. It is therefore imdifferent types of framing effects in risky choice and portant to know the antecedent conditions that deterthe effects of task domains on the risk preference of mine their appearance and disappearance. decision makers. A classical example of framing effects is Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) Asian disease problem. In their Risk Preferences in Different Task Domains study, subjects were asked to choose between a sure outcome that led to a certain survival of one third of Apparently, framing effects are not limited to specific 600 hypothetical patients (i.e., 200 people) and a risky decision tasks. However, framing effects and people's probabilistic outcome, a one-third probability that all risk preferences do vary as a function of task domains 600 people would survive and a two-thirds probability (e.g., Fagley & Miller, 1987; Schneider, 1992 ; Schneithat no one would survive. Tversky and Kahneman der & Lopes, 1986 ; Wagenaar, Keren, & Lichtenstein, found a pronounced reversal in risk preference as a 1988; Wang, 1996a; Wang & Johnston, 1995) . result of how the choice outcomes were framed. Most A question of interest in this study is how the task of their subjects (72%) favored the sure thing when the domains in which a problem is described influence the choice outcomes were framed in terms of lives saved risk preference in human choices. Given the same probwhereas most of the subjects (78%) in another group ability and payoff structure, a content and context-free favored the gamble (the probabilistic outcome) when utility model would predict the same risk preference the same choice outcomes were framed in terms of lives across different task domains. In other words, such lost. models would predict a similar risk preference pattern A framing effect, such as the one found in the Asian independent of whether the required choice is between disease problem, is often explained using Kahneman saving precious paintings or saving the same number and Tversky's prospect theory (1979) . Accordingly, peo-of human lives with the same probability. The present ple code the possible choice outcomes as gains and study examined this issue by using choice problems losses, and tend to be risk averse when choosing among that shared the same probability structure but were prospects seen as gains but risk seeking when choosing in three distinct task domains (i.e., life-death, public among prospects seen as losses. Thus, when choice op-property, and personal money). The choice outcomes of tions are framed positively, a decision maker tends to the problems presented in each of the three task doperceive them as gains and becomes more risk averse. mains had a binary structure of a sure thing vs a gamIn contrast, when the same choice options are framed ble of equal expected value and differed in their framnegatively, a decision maker tends to perceive them as ing conditions and the expected values. losses and becomes more risk seeking.
Risk sensitivity can be considered an adaptation to Alternative hypotheses of framing effects have also different environmental problems (e.g., Real, 1991; been proposed (e.g., Frisch, 1993; Reyna & Brainerd, Real & Caraco, 1986; Wang, 1996a; Wang, 1996b) . De-1991; Schneider, 1992) . These new hypotheses explore pending on the nature of a task, decision makers may possible mechanisms of framing effects beyond those have different minimum requirements in different task of prospect theory.
domains. The minimum requirement for a decision task Recently, Schneider, Levin, and Gaeth (1995) ad-then could be psychologically translated into a decision maker's aspiration level. When the mean expected dressed the limitations of using prospect theory as a value of choice options is above the minimum require-more susceptible to the dichotic effects of positive frame and negative frame. Therefore, the occurrence and abment, a rational choice would be risk-and variancesence of framing effects would vary categorically as a averse to avoid possible failures. In contrast, when the function of the perceived group contexts (e.g., large mean expected value is below the minimum requiregroup, small group, and family group) rather than a ment, a decision maker should be more risk-and varilinear function of the group size. However, it is not ance-seeking to maximize the probability of achieving clear how subjects would code the numerical numbers the goal. It is therefore expected that given two choice of expected value (i.e., 6000, 600, 60, and 6) in the outcomes, one sure thing and one gamble of equal expublic property and monetary domains. Although it is pected value, a decision maker would prefer the sure possible that subjects classify the problems categorithing if its expected value is above his/her aspiration cally (e.g., large money versus small money) the cut level but prefer the gamble if the expected value of point for such calcification may be more variable from the sure thing is below the task-determined aspiration individual to individual. Particularly, in the monetary level.
domain, subjects' risk perference may be more linearly In different task domains, however, the minimum related to the stated expected values. requirement or aspiration level of a decision maker may differ. While a sure outcome of saving one-third Bidirectional and Unidirectional Framing Effects of $6 may be preferable to a gamble of saving all $6 with a one-third probability for a person, a sure outcome
In a recent study, Wang and Johnston (1995) used of saving one-third of 6 family members may become a life-death decision paradigm similar to the Asian unacceptable for the same person. As a result, the per-disease problem. In this study, they argued that saving, son would be more likely to choose the alternative prob-on average, one-third of group may have distinct adapabilistic outcome that has a one-third probability to tive consequences depending on the size of the social save all 6 family members. It is therefore expected that group, and thus the risk attitude and framing effects compared to the counterpart problems presented in the may vary as a function of a systematic manipulation public property and monetary domains, the life-death of this variable. Framing effects appeared, disapchoice problems would evoke more risk-seeking peared, and reappeared in a markedly different form choices.
as the life-death problem was described in a large Moreover, in a task domain, manipulations along a group, a small group, and a family social context, rerisk-sensitive value dimension, say the total amount spectively. In a hypothetical large group context with of money involved in a choice problem, may result in either 6000 or 600 people involved, subjects' risk preferdifferent risk preferences. If so, the risk proneness re-ence indistinguishably reversed from predominantly flected by the percentage of subjects choosing either risk averse when the choice outcomes were framed in the sure thing or the gamble at each point of a selected terms of lives saved to predominantly risk seeking value dimension would be different. In the present when the same outcomes were framed in terms of lives study, the numerical numbers of the expected values lost. However, when the hypothetical patients were deused in each of the three task domains were 6000, 600, scribed in a small group or family context, no reversal 60, and 6. Along the expected value dimension in a in risk preference was found. The subjects were unamcertain task domain, a fuzzy area of ambiguous risk biguously risk seeking in order to save all the group preference may appear at a location dependent on the members. In addition, when the hypothetical patients selected values as well as the task, content, and context were described as subjects' own family members, the of the problem. This difference in the risk preference subjects, although clearly being risk seeking, became may affect people's susceptibility to the framing of significantly more risk seeking if the choice outcomes choice outcomes.
were framed negatively in terms lives lost. The percentBased on our previous findings (Wang & Johnston, age of subjects choosing the gamble over the sure thing 1995), it was predicted that the manipulation along the increased from 72% under positive framing to 94% ungroup size dimension (e.g., the total number of lives der negative framing. The extreme risk seeking in this described in the life-death problems) would yield a case seems to have been elicited by proposed choice group context-specific risk preference pattern. In a outcomes that were both objectively negative and negasmall group or a family context, subjects may hold a tively worded or framed. This is a different framing risk attitude that ''we all live or die together,'' and tend effect. In this case, the predominant choice preference to be risk seeking under both framing conditions. In is unidirectionally risk seeking under both framing conditions. contrast, in a large group situation, they may become It appears that framing effects take two distinct This distinction of the two types of framing effects can be used as an experimental probe for exploring forms. One type of framing effect involves preference reversal from predominantly risk averse to predomi-distinct cognitive mechanisms governing the risk attitude in different social situations. From this viewpoint, nantly risk seeking or vise versa, due to the dichotic effect of the framing of the choice outcomes. This bidi-the bidirectional framing effects in large group context, no framing effect in small group context, and the unidirectional framing effect (denoted B) is characterized by predominant risk-averse choices under positive fram-rectional framing effect in family context, found in our previous study (Wang & Johnston, 1995) , reflect differing and predominant risk-seeking choices under negative framing.
1 A second type of framing effect, unidirec-ent underlying decision mechanisms. Of equal importance, the current definition of bidirectional and uniditional framing effect, involves no preference reversal but a shift to a more extreme risk preference. If the rectional framing effects provides useful constraints for making experimental predictions. For example, based predominant preference is unidirectionally risk averse under both framing conditions, it is even more risk on the proposed relationship between the framing effects and task-determined risk preference, certain risk averse under positive frame than under negative frame. Similarly, if the predominant preference is uni-preference patterns (e.g., Ura-Urs-B; Urs-Ura-B; BUra-Urs; B-Urs-Ura; Ura-B-Ura; or Urs-B-Urs) would directionally risk seeking under both framing conditions, it is even more risk seeking under negative frame not occur along any selected value dimensions. These constraints also serve as a set of criteria for testing than under positive frame. Therefore, there are two possible forms of unidirectional effect, one augments and falsifying the proposed hypothesis. Although the selected range on a value dimension may not cover all the risk-averse preference (denoted Ura) and the other augments the risk-seeking preference (denoted Urs).
the effective points, the empirical results can be analyzed on the basis of these theoretical constraints. That This view suggests that bidirectional framing effects may result from the lack of clarity in choice prefer-is, if an unexpected pattern of framing effects is observed, the present hypothesis would be falsified. ences. A decision maker with an ambiguous or ambivalent risk preference may actively search for more inforIn sum, the experimental predictions of the present study include: (1) there would be a task-domain effect mation besides the task, content, and context variables embedded in a decision problem. In this condition, the on risk preference with a higher percentage of subjects choosing the gamble when the choice problems were decision maker's risk preference may rely on not only the choice options themselves but also the way in which presented in the life-death task domain; (2) framing effects would appear and disappear in different manthese choice options are worded, phrased, or framed. Both positive and negative frames thus may work effec-ners along the selected value dimension in different task domains; (3) the changes in subjects' risk pronetively but bidirectionally toward the opposite riskiness direction.
ness along the selected value dimension would appear to be more categorical in the life-death task domain On the other hand, the framing of choices may also lead to unidirectional effects. When the risk preference and more linear in the monetary domain; (4) a positive frame would tend to increase risk-averse (the sure is clear, a decision maker would resist a framing manipulation if it is inconsistent with the existing task-deter-thing) choices and a negative frame would tend to increase the risk-seeking (the gamble) choices; and (5) mined preference's direction. However, a framing manipulation consistent with an existing risk preference the observed framing effects would be identified as either bidirectional or unidirectional, and their occurmay augment that preference. Positive framing therefore could intensify risk-averse preferences whereas rence would follow a predicted pattern. negative framing could magnify risk-seeking preferences. Depending on the momentum of an existing pref-METHOD erence, the augmenting effect may be negligible or significant: The bigger the momentum, the larger the Experimental Materials effect.
The experimental paradigms of this study involved three distinct problem domains: human lives, public Note. P denotes positive framing; N denotes negative framing; 6000, 600, 60, and 6 are the number of lives at risk; r denotes that the hypothetical patients in the life-death decision problem were described as the subjects' relatives; life denotes the life-death problem. The overall risk-averse choice Å 35.4%. disease, (2) the number of museum paintings exposed the gamble under the positive frame than under the negative frame. If a unidirectional effect is risk-seeking to chemical pollution, or (3) the amount of money at risk due to a bankruptcy. In the life-death domain, augmenting, then more than 50% of subjects would choose the gamble over the sure thing under both group size six was used both in a small group context in which the hypothetical patients were six anonymous frames, but a significantly higher percentage of subjects would choose the gamble under the negative people and in a family context in which the six hypothetical patients were described as the subjects' close frame than under the positive frame. relatives.
The choice problems presented to each subject group Subjects and Procedure was framed either positively or negatively. A total of
The subjects were 902 undergraduate students en-26 choice problems were used in this study including rolled in introductory psychology courses who agreed five pairs of positively and negatively framed lifeto participate for extra course credit. The average age death problems, four pairs of museum paintings probof the subjects was 20.3 years. Subjects were randomly lems, and four pairs of personal money problems.
assigned to one of 26 experimental (subject) groups. Examples of the choice problems presented within Subjects were instructed that there were no right or each task domain appear in the Appendix.
wrong answers and were asked to choose anonymously For the current between-subject design, a 50-50 risk between two effectively identical choice options: a sure preference point (i.e., equal percentages of subjects faoutcome versus a gamble of equal expected value. voring the sure thing and the gamble in a binary deciOf the total subjects, 316 (207 females and 109 sion situation) can be considered a rough estimate of males) were randomly assigned to 10 groups, each rethe risk neutrality and therefore used as an operational ceiving one version of the five pairs of positively and reference point to classify the two proposed types of negatively framed life-death problems. Another 327 framing effect. A bidirectional framing effect would be subjects (196 females and 131 males) were assigned to featured by a higher than 50% of subjects choosing the the eight groups that received the four pairs of the sure thing under positive framing and a lower than public property (museum paintings) problems. The re-50% of subjects choosing the sure thing under negative maining 259 subjects (166 females and 93 males) reframing. On the other hand, in the case of a unidirecceived the four pairs of choice problems presented in tional framing effect, the two percentage data points the monetary domain. obtained under positive frame and negative frame would locate on the same side of the 50% reference RESULTS AND DISCUSSION point. If a unidirectional effect is risk-aversion augmenting, more than 50% of subjects would prefer the sure thing under both frames, but a significantly higher
The choice percentages, sample sizes, and x 2 statistics for framing effects obtained from the 10 groups percentage of subjects would prefer the sure thing over Note. P denotes positive framing; N denotes negative framing; 6000, 600, 60, and 6 are the number of paintings at risk; paintings denotes the museum paintings problem. The overall risk-averse choice Å 62.4%.
receiving the life-death problems, eight groups receiv-prominent when the selected group size was within a ing the museum paintings problems, and eight groups common range of human kith-and-kin groups. In a receiving the monetary problems are presented in Ta-small group or a familial context, the sure outcome of ble 1, Table 2, and Table 3, respectively. saving one-third of group members appears to fall below the subjects' aspiration level (their minimum reTask-Domain Effects on Risk Preference quirement). As a result, they chose the riskier probabilistic outcome. Under these conditions, revealed by anThe overall percentages of subjects choosing the sure other study (Wang, 1996b) , even when the choice of the thing across all pairs of framing groups were 35.4% for sure thing could save two-thirds of the hypothetical life-death problems, 62.4% for the museum paintings group members, a substantial proportion of subjects problems, and 64.9% for the personal money problems.
still preferred the probabilistic outcome that had a The first percentage differed greatly from the latter lower expected mean value of saving only one-third of two percentages, x 2 (2, N Å 902) Å 65.86, p õ .00001. the group members. There was no significant difference, however, in the The significantly higher percentage of subjects choosoverall risk preference between the data from the muing the sure thing when receiving the problems preseum paintings problems and those from the personal sented in either the public property (the museum paintmoney problems. As predicted, subjects were signifiings) domain or monetary domain suggests that the cantly more risk seeking when dealing with the choice problems in the life-death domain. This is particularly subjects had a lower aspiration level regarding the Note. P denotes positive framing; N denotes negative framing; 6000, 600, 60, and 6 are the number of dollars at risk; money denotes the personal money problem. The overall risk-averse choice Å 64.9%.
(Urs) in the family group context: a B-B-no-no-Urs pattern (for the theoretical and operational definitions of B, Ura, and Urs framing effects, see the relevant discussions in the Introduction and Method parts of the paper).
The framing effect found in the family group context was different from the two bidirectional framing effects found in the two large group contexts. For the two bidirectional effects, the choice percentage of the sure thing under the positive frame was above the 50% reference point but below 50% under the negative frame. However, the unidirectional framing effect found in the family context was featured by a significant preference shift from risk seeking under the positive frame to more risk seeking under the negative frame. That is, the negative framing accentuated the task-determined existing risk-seeking preference to a more extreme degree.
Museum paintings problem. x
2 analysis showed that the risk preferences between the eight subject A significant overall framing effect was found, x 2 (1, N Å 327) Å 13.14, p õ .0003.
As Table 2 shows, framing effects appeared and disappeared along the manipulated expected value dimenminimum proportion of the total value that had to be sion (i.e., the total number of paintings at risk) (see rescued.
also Fig. 2 
). Both bidirectional as well as unidirectional Bidirectional and Unidirectional Framing Effects in Each of the Three Task Domains
The patterns of framing effects emerging from the three task domains were different.
Life-death problem. There was a significant difference in subjects' choices over the 10 experimental groups, x 2 (9, N Å 327) Å 31.17, p õ .0003. The overall framing effect was also significant, x 2 (1, N Å 316) Å 14.31, p õ .0002.
A graphic representation of the dynamic pattern of the observed framing effects is shown in Fig. 1 . Both bidirectional and unidirectional framing effects appeared. The 50-50 choice distribution point, represented by the dotted line in the figure, was used as the reference for risk neutrality to classify the two types of framing effect. Also as summarized in Table 1 , as the social group context changed from large group with either 6000 or 600 people to smaller group with either 60 or 6 people, and to the family group with 6 hypothetical relatives, bidirectional framing effects (B) were found in the two large group contexts, followed by no and a risk-seeking augmenting unidirectional effect framing or negative framing condition separately. The only significant linear effect found was in the monetary domain and under the positive framing condition, x 2 (3, N Å 134) Å 17.30, p õ .0006. As the expected values increased from 6 to 6000, the number of subjects choosing the sure thing under the positive framing linearly increased from 52 to 92%.
Effects of Frames on Risk Preference
Although the patterns of framing effects were task specific, there evidently was a dynamic regularity with regard to the occurrence of framing effects across all three task domains. All the seven framing effects found in the 13 pairs of choice problems showed a positive frame-risk aversion and/or negative frame-risk seeking pattern.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

FIG. 3. Percentages of the risk averse choice as a function of the
The seemingly erratic pattern of framing effects may amount of hypothetical money at risk plotted logarithmically.
have its dynamic regularities. The basic notion of the current hypothesis is that the primary determinants of a decision maker's risk preference are the task, content, and contexts variables inherent in a decision problem. framing effects were identified. Unlike the categorical These factors determine the aspiration level of a decipattern of B-B-no-no found in the life-death domain, sion maker and his/her risk attitude. A decision maker the framing effects showed a Ura-no-B-B pattern. See will tend to be risk seeking when facing a loss than a Table 2 for the x 2 statistics and p values. gain. In the case of a gain, the mean expected value of Personal money problem. An overall analysis choice outcomes is more likely to be above the aspirashowed that subjects' choice preferences in the eight sub-tion level (the minimum requirement) of a decision ject groups differed markedly, x 2 (7, N Å 259) Å 25.33, maker whereas, in the case of a loss, the mean expected p õ .0007. An overall framing effect, although much value is more likely to be below the reference level. smaller than those found with the life-death problems Positive frame of choice outcomes emphasizes the and the museum paintings problems, was statistically ''gain'' aspect of a prospect whereas negative frame emsignificant, x 2 (1, N Å 259) Å 4.44, p õ .04. phasizes the ''loss'' aspect of the prospect. In other As summarized in Table 3 and illustrated in Fig. 3 , words, positive frame tends to increase the perceived of the four selected levels along a monetary dimension surplus and decrease the perceived deficit between the (i.e., the total amount of money at risk), only a unidirec-aspiration level and the expected mean value of choice tional framing effect was found (see Table 3 for x 2 sta-outcomes. On the other hand, negative frame tends to tistic and p value). The pattern was Ura-no-no-no, sug-increase the perceived deficit and decrease perceived gesting that the subjects' risk preference was quite surplus between the aspiration level of a decision clear and stable when dealing with personal money maker and the expected mean value of choice outcomes. type of problems with the total amount of money rang-However, whether or not the framing will have an efing from $6000 to $6. fect on the risk preference of a decision maker depends on the direction and intensity of the risk preference Changes in Risk Preferences along the Expected Value elicited by task, content, and context variables in a Dimension decision problem.
The framing of choice outcomes may induce two difTo examine whether there is a linear increase in risk preference for the sure thing as the numerical number ferent types of effects in risky choices. When a decision maker's risk preference is ambiguous or weak, s/he of the expected value in each task domain increased from 6 to 6000, a series of six linearity tests were con-may become susceptible to both positive and negative frames of choices. The positive frame tends to pull a ducted for each of the three tasks under either positive choice in the risk-averse direction and the negative tional framing effect involved a preference shift, either frame in the risk-seeking direction (i.e., a bidirectional risk averse or risk seeking, due to the framing of choice effect). However, when the risk preference is unambig-outcomes. In the case of risk-aversion augmenting efuous, a decision maker will be more immune from the fect, more than 50% of subjects preferred the sure thing framing manipulations. Therefore, the framing of under both positive and negative framing conditions choices will have either no effect or a unidirectional but even more of them preferred the sure thing under effect that augments the decision maker's existing pref-positive frame. When the augmenting effect was in the erence.
direction of risk seeking, on the other hand, a majority of subjects chose the gamble over the sure thing of To examine the dynamic functions of risk preference equal expected value under both framing conditions, and framing effects in different social task domains, but the choice of the gamble became even more domichoice problems sharing the same formal probability nant among subjects under negative frame. structure and expected values were presented in different task domains under either positive or negative It appears that the framing of choices as a weak framing condition.
editing factor in choice making processes shows its effects when (1) the risk preference of a decision maker 1. The risk preference data revealed a task-specific is weak, or (2) it can accentuate an existing risk preferpattern. Subjects were significantly more risk seeking ence. The framing of choices does not determine risk when facing life-death choice problems than facing preference; it only regulates an existing risk attitude their counterpart problems presented in a public propthat is determined primarily by the task, content, and erty or personal money domain. This finding is in context variables inherent in choice problems. agreement with the hypothesis that the subjects' aspiration level (the minimum requirement) for the lifeAlthough the author did not directly test it, Frisch death problems was higher than that for the public (1993) expressed a similar idea, that if subjects do not property and personal money problems.
really care whether they choose a sure outcome or a gamble, then minor variations in wording or phrasing 2. Framing effects appeared and disappeared as a would greatly influence their choices. On this view, one result of experimental manipulations along the sewould expect that the proportions of subjects showing lected expected value dimension.
the framing effect would increase as the strength of 3. The patterns of risk preference obtained from the preference within each frame decreases. three task domains were different. In the life-death Several investigators have argued that the classical domain, a group-context specific pattern emerged. Bidiframing effects (bidirectional effects in the present rectional framing effect appeared in the large group definition) occur only when ambiguity about a choice context (i.e., 6000life and 600life groups) and disapproblem is high. For example, the framing effects occur peared in the small group context (i.e., 60life and 6life when people are ambiguous in their experiences of congroups), and a risk-seeking augmenting unidirectional sequences of a decision (e.g., Frisch, 1993; Hoch & Ha, framing effect occurred in the family context (i.e., 6rlife 1986), when consumers are unfamiliar with the prodgroups). In addition, the risk preference patterns were ucts they have to choose among (e.g., Bettman & Sujan, indistinguishable within the large group context or 1987), or when the information about the consequences within the small group context. of choice is incomplete or limited (e.g., Schoorman, Although in none of the three task domains, the risk Mayer, Douglas, & Hetrick, 1994) . preference data revealed a complete linear trend over
In a recent study, Reyna and Brainerd (1991) prethe manipulated value dimension under both framing sented a modified version of the Asian disease problem conditions, the monetary problems elicited more linearly correlated changes in risk preference under posi- (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) to their subjects with tive framing as the expected values increased from 6, either positively framed or negatively framed choice 60, 600, to 6000. outcomes. They manipulated the explicitness of the problem by replacing the numerical information of ex-4. All the observed framing effects showed a positive pected payoff values and/or probabilities of choice outframe-risk aversion and negative frame-risk seeking relationship.
comes with qualitative information such as ''some,'' ''many,'' ''few,'' or ''higher.'' What is interesting here is 5. Two types of framing effects were theoretically that the classical (bidirectional) framing effects were defined and empirically identified. In the case of a bidinot only observed in the subjects' choices but also aprectional framing effect, a majority of the subjects prepeared to be sensitive to the amount of numerical inforferred the sure outcome under a positive frame but the gamble under a negative frame. In contrast, a unidirec-mation replaced by the qualitative information. The amplitude of the framing effect peaked when all of the of the distinction between framing effect and what is numerical information was replaced, presumably when called reflection effect (Fagley, 1993) . Reflection and the problem was least explicit and most ambiguous to framing effects are two distinct phenomena. In the latthe subjects.
ter, changes in risk preferences are caused by phrasing It is also worth mentioning that the choice pattern the same choice outcomes as though they are gains from the five pairs of framing groups receiving the life-versus phrasing them as though they are losses. The death problems replicated our previous findings dis-reflection effect is a decision bias, but not a cognitive cussed earlier in this paper (Wang & Johnston, 1995) . illusion. It refers to having opposite preferences for the This validity check lends additional support to the no-positive versus negative prospects (i.e., whether the tion that social group size and perceived social contexts outcomes are net gains or net losses). Reflection effects are powerful contextual variables affecting human do not involve the same choice outcomes described as choices.
though they are gains or losses; reflection effects inThe observed choice preferences in the present study volve real gains and loses. From this perspective, the showed a clear task domain-specific pattern. Both nor-framing effect (the bidirectional effect by the present mative theories such as expected utility theory and de-definition) is an irrational choice phenomenon but the scriptive theories such as prospect theory are silent reflection effect is not. about the specific roles of the task, content, and context Second, the task-specific choice pattern observed in of a decision problem in regulating the risk preference the current results suggests that framing effects should in human choices. Research has repeatedly demon-be examined separately from the contextual effects that strated that given the identical formal probability have often resulted from presenting the same choice structure of choice prospects, changes in a cover story options in different scenarios or cover stories. Contexabout the context in which a decision problem occurs tual description in a cover story is not a decoration for often resulted in significant reversal or shift in respon-an abstract problem but a real condition that triggers dents' risk proneness (e.g., Schneider, 1992 ; Wagenaar, different risk attitudes. Although the expected values Keren, & Lichtenstein, 1988; Wang, 1996a ; Wang & of two choice problems may be the same, the opposite Johnston, 1995).
risk preferences could be produced by changing the soRecently some researchers have proposed that future cial context in which the problem is described. This research should consider content and context of deci-contextual effect is not a result of a cognitive illusion, sion or reasoning problems not as intervening or deco-and therefore it should be clearly distinguished from a rative variables but as primary and defining factors of bidirectional framing effect. Unlike presenting a glass human reasoning and judgement. From this perspec-as ''half full'' versus ''half empty,'' contextual differtive, the content and contextual variables can be used ences specified in different task domains are meaningeither for evaluating human judgment or as a research ful antecedent factors that determine choice preferprobe to uncover the underlying psychological mecha-ences. nisms (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Gigerenzer, 1996;  Third, the current findings call attention to the ne- Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992 , Lopes & Oden, 1991 . cessity to classify framing effects by their forms: the bidirectional effects involving a reversal in risk preferSeveral Conceptual Distinctions Regarding Framing ences versus the unidirectional framing effects involvEffects ing a preference shift. Framing effects are commonly considered as one of The notion of framing effects involves quite different the most severe violations of normative utility axioms, connotations. The word framing was used to refer to a and therefore a strong indication of irrationality. Framvariety of situations including any changes in a deciing effects violate the description invariance axiom of sion context, in complex mental accounting of prosutility theory of rational choices, which states that difpects, or in simple wording of choice options or outferent descriptions of the same choices should yield the comes. In this article, the term is restricted to the posisame preference order. In a framing condition, whether tive and negative ways of presenting choice outcomes.
the change in phrasing the same decision prospect reIn other words, the framing of decisions is defined in sults in a significant reversal in risk preference appears terms of how a problem is described to a decision maker to be a key aspect for determining the rationality of but not in terms of how that person mentally reprethe choices. The classical, bidirectional framing effects sents the problem.
often led to an irrational reversal in risk preferences To facilitate discussions of framing effects, several points need to be clarified. First, one needs to be aware under different framing conditions. However, in the
